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 Of the many changes that Russian foreign policy has undergone since the end of 
the Brezhnev era, the evolution of Russia’s policy toward Saudi Arabia is particularly 
striking. This change in foreign policy toward Saudi Arabia and the greater Arabian 
Peninsula is a dramatic departure from the policies of exploiting regional conflicts to gain 
political influence and military footholds that characterized the Brezhnev era. What has 
changed in this relationship is not merely the liquidation of Russian military presence in 
the region or the fact that the Middle East is no longer a field of competition for dueling 
superpowers. Instead, it is the essence of what motivates Russian foreign policy that has 
been transformed. Russian foreign policy toward Saudi Arabia is now motivated by 
economic interests and to a lesser extent, national security concerns. Saudi Arabia is no 
longer the prized jewel to be influenced in an ongoing campaign to diminish US standing 
in the region. Instead, Russia views Saudi Arabia as both an economic competitor and 
potential partner. Russia also views Saudi Arabia as a state whose religious influence must 
be harnessed to serve Russian security imperatives, and as a state whose security concerns 
will have to be taken into consideration when dealing with other states in the region. 
To begin exploring the changing nature of this relationship, this paper will trace 
Soviet policies in the Middle East that impacted relations with Saudi Arabia and the Saudi 
response to these policies.  Next, the role Mikhail Gorbachev’s “New Thinking” played in 
precipitating far-reaching change in Russian foreign policy toward the Gulf will be 
examined. Finally, this paper will survey the three key concerns that currently drive 
Russian foreign policy toward Saudi Arabia: oil and natural gas, arms and technology trade 
with Iran and Israel and Islamic extremism. Examining this change in Russian foreign 
policy and these key areas of current interest will provide much insight into what motivates 
Russian foreign policy in general and what the future of Russian-Saudi relations may hold. 
 
A Short History of Russian-Saudi Relations to 1979 
 
Modern Russian interaction with Saudi Arabia dates back to the 1920s, a time 
when much of the Middle East was under British mandate. The landmass that later became 
modern-day Saudi Arabia was still divided amongst rival tribes. The Hejaz, home to 
Mecca, Medina, and the port of Jeddah, was under control of the Hashemites, a favorite of 
the British, whose members also ruled Transjordan and Iraq. When the Hejaz was captured 
by the rival al-Saud, the USSR was delighted to immediately recognize them as the area’s 
legitimate rulers. Unlike the Hashemites, the al-Saud were not beholden to British support. 
Naturally, the Soviets saw this as a prime opportunity to both curb British imperialism and 
make an ally of their own in the region.1 This would not be the last time the Soviet Union 
sought to influence Saudi Arabia vis-à-vis another great power.  
Relations between Russia and Saudi Arabia tapered off to an eventual end 
following a trade dispute in 1928 and interaction between the two states would remain 
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 dormant until Nikita Khrushchev came to power.2 The Middle East soon became centrally 
important to expanding the USSR’s influence across the Third World at the expense of its 
rivals, as US and British influence and military presence in the region was already strong.3 
Therefore, good relations with Saudi Arabia were an obvious objective of Soviet foreign 
policy. Despite its high value as a potential client in the region, Soviet actions 
overwhelmingly proved to alienate Saudi Arabia and would forestall diplomatic relations 
for three and a half decades. 
The first instance in which the Soviet Union and Saudi Arabia found themselves at 
odds was in North Yemen following a Nasserist coup there in 1962. When Egypt, Saudi 
Arabia’s rival for leadership of the Arab world, moved seventy-thousand troops into North 
Yemen to bolster the republican forces that recently came to power, the Saudis responded 
by lending material support to the deposed royalist forces in their bid to regain power. 
When Egyptian troops were withdrawn from North Yemen in the wake of Egypt’s defeat 
in the 1967 war with Israel, the USSR quickly moved to fill the void, supplying MiG 
fighters, Ilyushin bombers, small arms, regular airlift support and even pilots for the 
Yemen Arab Republic Air Force.4 The Saudis were already wary of the Soviets because of 
their relationship with Egypt and this move seemed to confirm their suspicions that the 
Soviets had larger designs on the region. Both states soon found themselves engaging each 
other by-proxy once again in The People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (South 
Yemen). The Soviets provide substantial training to the new Marxist government there and 
gained a military foothold in the process. Technical and material support was nominal, but 
extensive access was given to Soviet military schools. A party school was also established 
by the Soviets, complete with Soviet instructors to teach Marxist-Leninist theory and party 
control methods in an effort to ensure the Soviet (as opposed to Maoist) interpretation of 
Marxism-Leninism became firmly entrenched within the PDRY government. In addition, 
the USSR increased its offshore naval presence, made use of the port of Aden as a 
submarine base, and took control of former British airfields for reconnaissance flights 
during its involvement there.5 In response to the growing presence of the USSR in its 
neighborhood, the Saudis proceeded to arm and support tribal factions purged from the 
PDRY army in their bid to overthrow the Aden government. The Saudi-backed campaign 
amounted to little more than a series of raids, with the movement having no clear agenda 
or appeal to the general population. The movement steadily declined, and after being fairly 
inactive in its aid, Riyadh formally ceased their support when it normalized relations with 
the PDRY.6
This same policy of intervening in internal conflicts to support socialist-oriented 
regimes that have come, or are fighting to come, to power continued to be employed by the 
Soviet Union into the 1970s. The Saudis perceived this policy as one of steady 
encirclement and were further alarmed by the growing relationship between the USSR and 
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 Iraq, which began with arms sales and culminated in a Treaty of Cooperation and 
Friendship in 1972.  The Soviet Union and Saudi Arabia gave support to opposing sides 
during the Marxist Dhofar rebellion in Oman and continued to match each other’s support 
tit-for-tat in places like Ethiopia and Somalia, with Saudi Arabia going so far in the case of 
the latter to advocate US military and economic assistance. The Saudis also extended aid to 
anti-Soviet forces outside of the greater Arabian Peninsula area, including Zaire and 
Angola.7 Finally, the Saudis scored their biggest coup when Egyptian President Anwar 
Sadat, with whom the Saudis had been cultivating a relationship, ordered the withdrawal of 
Soviet advisors in 1972. In seizing upon the many opportunities to gain influence and 
military footholds, the USSR set itself back in achieving its foreign policy goal of 
developing relations with Saudi Arabia. 
 
The Policies of the Late Brezhnev Era 
 
After making the Saudis wary and later hostile to its foreign policy in the 1960s and 
1970s, the Soviet Union opted to attempt to exploit cracks in Saudi-American relations in 
order to get closer to the desert kingdom. After the Saudis condemned the outcome of the 
US-sponsored Camp David Accords and joined in expelling Egypt from the Arab League, 
the Soviets wasted no time commencing a charm offensive aimed at bringing the Saudis 
around to rapprochement.8 In a January 1979 article entitled “Saudi Arabia: What Next?” 
Soviet Middle East specialist Igor Belyayev asserted that Saudi fear and mistrust of the 
USSR was largely created and stoked by the US media. Belyayev also argued that there 
were no serious impediments to renewed Soviet-Saudi relations, even quoting a senior 
Saudi Prince as being amenable to the possible reestablishment of diplomatic ties.9  
This appeal in Soviet commentary for better relations continued in the subsequent 
months, highlighting the fact that the USSR and Saudi Arabia shared the same position on 
resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict and accusing the US of fanning Saudi fears in order to 
gain a military advantage of its own.10 In regards to growing US arms exports to Saudi 
Arabia that included Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) and F-15 fighter 
aircraft, one commentator accused the US of “using Saudi money to build reserve bases in 
Saudi Arabia, fully equipped and waiting to be used by American forces.” He argued that 
by doing so the US was “ignoring the will and aspirations of the true masters of this region 
– the peoples who inhabit it.”11 In effect, the Soviets were trying to cast the US as a 
meddlesome, destabilizing force in the region in hopes of appearing more reasonable to the 
Saudis by comparison. By touting its pro-Palestinian credentials, portraying the US in a 
negative light and consistently calling for relations, the USSR believed Saudi Arabia 
would soon come around to restoring diplomatic ties. 
It is difficult to assess how well the strategy of exploiting cracks in the US-Saudi 
relationship was working because amid this flurry of commentary came the eruption of 
conflict in Afghanistan. Faced with the prospect of an allied socialist nation on its border 
disintegrating into factional rule and threatening a spillover effect on the rest of the Central 
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 Asian Soviet republics, the USSR, in accordance with the Brezhnev doctrine, decided to 
intervene. The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan on Christmas Eve 1979 to aid the 
unpopular Marxist government in regaining control over a rebelling population that 
resented secular reforms.12 The Soviets also saw the ensuing unrest as an element of the 
US’s “imperialist strategy,” with Afghanistan being a suitable place for the US to 
reconstitute electronic listening posts that were lost when the Shah of Iran was toppled.13  
From a Saudi and American point of view, the invasion represented a Soviet thrust 
toward the Persian Gulf area, putting Soviet forces several hundred miles closer than they 
had been to the Arabian Peninsula and its oil reserves. While a thrust toward the Gulf was 
not likely part of the Soviet calculus, the invasion led President Jimmy Carter to comment 
on the situation in his 1980 State of the Union address, stating that any hostile actions by 
the Soviets in the Persian Gulf would be considered an attack on the vital interests of the 
US and that “such an assault would be repelled by any means necessary.”14  
The US soon concluded that a forceful response was indeed necessary and the best 
option was to arm the Afghan rebellion. The Saudis, who by now were convinced that 
Soviet foreign policy was unquestionably aggressive and hostile to Muslim states, became 
a natural and willing partner in this endeavor. The Saudis provided much of the funding 
that was channeled through the Pakistani intelligence service to furnish training and 
equipment for the resistance, matching the CIA’s contributions dollar for dollar between 
1981 and 1984.15 Saudi Arabia also provided some of the Arab manpower that joined the 
resistance, enabling its citizens to visit and train at mujahideen camps in Pakistan.  
Once again, the USSR and Saudi Arabia were engaged in indirect conflict with 
each other, and by the mid-1980s, relations between the two were no better off than they 
were two decades earlier. Afghanistan was simply the latest in a string of situations in 
which Soviet policies toward the Third World, specifically the Middle East, conflicted 
with its own desire to have diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia. The policy of trying to 
gain influence wherever there was an opening by befriending the current radical 
government or helping a new one come to power, could not be reconciled with Saudi 
Arabia’s own need to feel secure amongst its neighbors. Therefore, the strategy that was 
employed by the Soviets for twenty years ultimately failed to advance their foreign policy 
objectives toward Saudi Arabia. 
 
The Impact of New Thinking 
 
In 1985, just as Soviet efforts in Afghanistan began to falter, Mikhail Gorbachev 
became General Secretary of the Communist Party. His outlook on international relations 
and policies of New Thinking were a significant departure from the foreign policy carried 
out during the Brezhnev era. Gorbachev recognized that the nations of the world were 
becoming increasingly interdependent. He believed that unbridled competition in terms of 
weaponry and world influence served only to threaten international security and that an 
enormous amount of energy and resources had already been diverted from other priorities 
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 because of such competition.16 In practical terms, this meant a shift in foreign policy was 
in the offing, with influence and military presence in the Third World becoming less 
important in the future. In the very beginning of the foreign policy portion of his speech to 
the twenty-seventh congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), 
Gorbachev stated that “the tasks of the country’s economic and social development also 
determines the CPSU’s international strategy.”17 In other words, the most pressing issues 
of the day, such as economic reform, would have an increased bearing on Soviet foreign 
policymaking. Among other things, this new outlook had implications for Afghanistan. In 
his speech Gorbachev went on to refer to Afghanistan as a “bleeding wound,” and while 
the USSR “supports the country’s efforts aimed at defending it sovereignty,” extricating 
itself from this conflict and bringing its troops home would be high on the Soviet foreign 
policy agenda.18
Gorbachev also explicitly stated that the Soviet Union was “in favor of stepping up 
collective searches for ways of defusing conflict situations in the Middle East.”19 The 
Soviet Union did just that when it cosponsored a UN resolution with the US calling for a 
cease-fire in the war between Iran and Iraq.20 It was clear that Gorbachev was interested in 
curbing geo-strategic competition with the US in order to build trust and cooperation, as 
well as to allow the Soviet Union to focus more of its attention and resources on internal 
demands. Once the USSR completed its withdrawal from Afghanistan, Soviet and Saudi 
officials began to seriously discuss normalizing relations.  
Shortly after these developments came the ultimate test of New Thinking’s 
practicality: the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. There was a great deal of internal debate in the 
Kremlin concerning what position the USSR should take on this crisis. The Soviet Union 
was faced with a choice of either following through on Gorbachev’s vision of building a 
strong, cooperative relationship with the West and entering an interdependent world free of 
zero-sum competition, or drifting back to the more conservative policies of maintaining 
regional influence.21 It is important to consider what the USSR had to lose by joining the 
international coalition in condemning Iraq. By its own estimates, the USSR stood to lose 
approximately $800 million in trade and payments, mostly from tripartite oil deals and 
arms sales as well as an additional $5-20 billion in lost debt repayment.22 In addition to 
these economic disincentives, the USSR would have to live with what conservatives in the 
Kremlin considered to be a blow to its own prestige if it were to ignore its own interests 
and condone a US led intervention.23  
Reluctant to abandon its long-time trading partner but also committed to remaining 
on the right side of world opinion, the Soviets opted for a middle-of-the-road approach. As 
the crisis wore on, Soviet diplomats laboriously tried to convince Saddam Hussein to 
withdraw from Kuwait in order to save the USSR’s trade relationship with Iraq, or at least 
ensure that it remained in salvageable condition after hostilities ceased.24 More 
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 importantly, however, the USSR never withdrew its support of the US-led coalition and 
enjoyed a worthwhile pay off as a result. In addition to upholding some of the principles of 
New Thinking and improving its standing with the West, the USSR was rewarded with 
what it had been seeking for decades. In September 1990, diplomatic relations with Saudi 
Arabia were restored and the Saudis offered a $1.5 billion aid package to the USSR. The 
Soviet Union was also delighted by the prospect of Saudi investment in their economy and 
arms deals with the kingdom. This episode would help set the course for future Russian 
foreign policy. From this point on, relations would primarily be conducted in pursuit of 
tangible rewards, not military or geopolitical superiority vis-à-vis the US.25
 
A Look to the Present 
 
 In the years that have followed since the end of the Cold War, Russia’s priorities 
have shifted from trying match US military and political strength, to reforming and 
growing its economy and coming to grips with ethnic and religious strife. Despite this 
seemingly more inward-looking priority shift, relations and interaction with Saudi Arabia 
still figure prominently into the post-Soviet national agenda. Russia and Saudi Arabia must 
still deal with each other on three key issues that are central to Russia’s economic growth 
and the easing of ethno-religious troubles. First, Russia and Saudi Arabia find themselves 
as competitors and potential partners in the world energy market.  Second, Saudi Arabia 
has objections and concerns about Russia’s commercial dealings and growing relationships 
with Iran and Israel. Finally, Moscow’s relationship with Riyadh is an important part of 
quelling Islamist extremism within its borders and integrating its Muslim minority in order 
to prevent future religiously-charged political violence. In short, Russia’s relationship with 
Saudi Arabia, in both competitive and cooperative aspects, is one determined by economic 
interests and national security concerns, not the desire for strategic influence that 
characterized its foreign policy in the past. 
 
Energy: Competition and Cooperation 
 
 With economic growth ranking high on the national and foreign policy agenda, the 
success and profit of Russia’s oil and natural gas industry is of utmost importance to the 
Russian economy, as well as the health of the government’s treasury. Saudi Arabia and 
Russia are the number one and number two oil producers in the world respectively, but 
despite sharing this distinction, both have very different pricing policies, bringing both 
states into direct competition. This competition is virtually non-existent in the natural gas 
sector, and the many incentives for cooperation in this area could form the basis for better 
relations and policy coordination on other issues.  
 
Oil  
 
The 1990s were a troubling time for the Russian oil industry with production 
declining to 6.1 million barrels per day (b/d) in 1996, down 5.4 million b/d from 1987 
levels.26 However, a turnaround began in 1999 as world oil prices began to rise. 
Production is now booming and Russia’s output is second only to Saudi Arabia. With 
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 prices high and output growing at a rate of 800,000 b/d annually, Russia is growing 
increasingly accustomed to and even dependant on the large revenue that comes with such 
a boom.27 Therefore, oil interests are no doubt a top consideration for Russia in 
formulating its foreign policy. 
 Before going any further, it is important to understand Russia’s position in the 
world oil market relative to Saudi Arabia. Russia holds 6.2 percent of the world’s proven 
oil reserves, compared to Saudi Arabia’s 22 percent.28 Unlike Saudi Arabia, geography is a 
limiting factor for Russia’s oil industry. Much of Russia’s unexploited reserves lie in artic 
and far eastern areas and the location and extreme climes of these reserves present 
additional challenges and costs to their development. Russia also lacks the robust pipeline 
infrastructure and deep water terminals that are required to accommodate the large tankers 
that can carry oil across the Atlantic to the US.  A pipeline to the Pacific, intended to serve 
tankers bound for Japan, South Korea and the US, is currently under construction and is 
expected to be completed in 2008, however. 
In contrast, Saudi Arabia has easy access to its unexploited reserves, a well 
developed pipeline system and access to deep water terminals on both the Red Sea and 
Persian Gulf. Another key difference between the Saudi and Russian industries is state 
control. Saudi ARAMCO is state owned and the kingdom is a member of the Organization 
of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and as such it is capable and willing to increase 
or decrease production as needed to control prices. While there is growing concern over 
increased state control, particularly due to the growing strength of the state-controlled 
firms Gazprom and Rosneft, approximately 70 percent of Russia’s oil industry remains 
privatized, making the regulation of production more difficult to coordinate.29
 The fundamental difference in the oil policies of Russia and Saudi Arabia stems 
from each state’s unique position in the world oil market. As a country with a large 
population and small reserves relative to other top producers, Russia favors a strategy of 
short-term revenue maximization. Saudi Arabia, a country with much larger reserves, low 
production costs, a small population and low domestic consumption, favors a strategy of 
long-term revenue maximization.30 It is in Saudi Arabia’s interest to extend the life of its 
oil economy as long as possible because it has the reserves to do so and because its 
economy is less diversified than an economy like Russia’s. Russia, on the other hand, does 
not have the infrastructure or cheaply exploitable reserves that are suited for long term 
maximization and instead seeks to make the most of current boom times. These differing 
strategies bring Russia and Saudi Arabia into direct competition and disagreement with 
each other on world oil pricing policy. 
 Saudi Arabia’s policy is to keep prices at a moderate level that is acceptable to 
world consumers, especially the United States. While Saudi Arabia certainly wants prices 
that will generate healthy revenue, it is sensitive to prices becoming too high. If prices 
were to remain too high for an extended period of time, this could prompt a dedicated 
effort by consumers to develop and implement the use of alternative fuels and 
conservation. If and when oil alternatives such as fuel cells or hydrogen became 
inexpensive and commonplace, Saudi oil fields would be significantly devalued and the 
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 incentive for the US to ensure security in the Persian Gulf would be greatly reduced.31 The 
obsolescence of oil is certainly in the distant future, but Saudi Arabia is intent on slowing 
the emergence of a truly competitive alternative fuel industry. In order to influence world 
oil prices, Saudi Arabia keeps a portion of its production capacity idle so that it can pump 
more oil in times of shortage or crisis and thus keep prices stable.  
 Russia and Saudi Arabia first came into conflict over oil prices in late 2001. 
Unrestrained production by non-members, including Russia, led OPEC to call on all 
producers to coordinate a curb on production to prevent a price collapse. OPEC planned to 
cut production by 1.5 million b/d and requested that non-members collectively pledge a 
500,000 b/d cut, with Russia cutting 150,000 b/d of that sum. The Russian government 
balked at this, agreeing to only cut 30,000 b/d, not yet ready to let go of the windfall 
revenue that came from its increased production over the past two years. Russian officials 
cited two reasons for not wanting to join in the production cut. First, Russia did not want to 
lose any additional revenue, as it already stood to lose some in the coming months as 
Siberian operations began to slow down for winter. Second, Russia wanted to regain 
market share lost after the disintegration of the USSR.32 However, as the threat of a price 
collapse continued to loom, Russia finally agreed to the originally requested cuts.  
Russia and Saudi Arabia also collided on oil pricing during the run up to the 
American invasion of Iraq in early 2003. Saudi Arabia pledged to raise production by as 
much as 2.5 million b/d to make up for any supply shortages that might occur as a result of 
hostilities. This elicited a harsh response from Russia, in which deputy prime minister, 
Viktor Khristenko warned that if OPEC “played politics” with the war in Iraq, “it would be 
the beginning of the end of the organization.”33 The roles were now reversed, with Russia 
fearing that a price collapse could result from OPEC’s rapid expansion of production.  
 In September 2003, then-Crown Prince Abdullah visited Moscow to ease tensions 
over pricing and to begin a dialogue on developing a mechanism by which Russia and 
Saudi Arabia could coordinate their pricing policies toward mutually beneficial ends.34 It 
is important to note, however, that Saudi Arabia does have some leverage over Russia. 
Saudi Arabia has confronted the problem of “quota busters” before, and its position in the 
world oil market gives it the ability to punish those who are uncooperative. It can use its 
excess capacity to drive prices down to a level that would make production unprofitable for 
Russian firms. Saudi Arabia’s low production costs allow it to still turn a handsome profit 
at $10/barrel while Russian production becomes unprofitable at $12/barrel.35 It is unlikely 
that Russia will provoke such actions given the fact that every $1/barrel decline in prices 
cuts around $1 billion from its federal budget revenue.36 With both states being dependent 
on their oil wealth to varying degrees, there is a shared interest in maintaining a mutually 
satisfactory price range and cooperation on the issue is likely. Of course, during periods of 
record demand that force both Russia and Saudi Arabia to produce at full capacity, pricing 
policy becomes less contentious an issue. 
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 Natural Gas 
 
 Another area in which Russia and Saudi Arabia share similar economic interests 
and cooperative potential is the natural gas industry. Russia is the world’s largest exporter 
of natural gas, possessing an estimated 1688.0 trillion cubic feet of the resource, or 26.6 
percent of the world’s total proven reserves.37 Unfortunately, much like its oil reserves, 
most of Russia’s untapped reserves are found in some of its more hostile environments 
such as Siberia and the Artic Ocean. The costs associated with developing these distant and 
difficultly situated fields are daunting, mainly due to the transportation infrastructure that 
would need to be further developed to be able to deliver gas to consumers.38 In contrast, 
Saudi Arabia has not placed as much emphasis on developing its smaller natural gas 
deposits until recently. Through the 1990s, the kingdom has become more reliant on 
natural gas for its power generation, petrochemical manufacturing and water desalination 
needs and has expressed a desire for more investment in its natural gas industry.39 It is 
widely believed that Saudi Arabia has considerable gas reserves that have yet to be fully 
exploited and is therefore is becoming increasingly attractive to non-Saudi firms in the 
business of exploration and development. 
 This opening presents a prime opportunity for Russia to advance economic interests 
and build the foundation for cooperation on other issues.40 This is also an opportunity for 
both states to finally realize the vibrant trade and investment relationship that was 
supposed to materialize after the USSR supported US intervention and sanctions against 
Iraq in 1991. Gazprom, for example, has considerable experience in natural gas exploration 
and development and would benefit greatly from the opportunity to develop the much 
more accessible Saudi gas deposits.  
This is already beginning to happen. After “core venture” agreements with several 
Western energy firms fell through in 2003, Saudi Arabia, still intent on attracting 
investment in its gas reserves, signed exploration and development deals with several 
international firms. One of these firms was LUKoil, Russia’s largest privately owned 
energy firm.41 Saudi ARAMCO also conferred official contractor status on Stroitransgaz in 
2003 so it could participate in future oil and gas projects.42 Cooperation on energy policy 
between Russia and Saudi Arabia may only be in its infant stages, but it is clear there is 
great potential in the natural gas sector for both states to prosper through joint efforts.  
 
Israel 
 
 Since the end of the Cold War, Russian relations with Israel have warmed 
significantly in many respects, much to the chagrin of Saudi Arabia. Up until this point, 
policy toward Israel was one of few similarities shared by both states. Cooperation to 
advance their common position on settling the Arab-Israeli conflict was traditionally seen 
as a potential point of departure for improving relations between Russia and Saudi Arabia. 
Nevertheless, Russia has cultivated a close relationship predicated on strong mutual 
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 economic, cultural and counterterrorism interests with Israel. It is unlikely Moscow will 
forego these new ties simply to maintain its pro-Palestinian credentials in the Arab world. 
 Relations began to thaw in 1991 when diplomatic relations with Israel resumed and 
immigration restrictions that prevented refuseniks from moving to Israel were lifted.43 
Over the course of the 1990s, an estimated one million Russian Jews immigrated to Israel, 
and now make up twenty percent of the population and are a powerful political, cultural 
and economic force in the country.  In particular, they are a much sought after bloc of 
swing voters in Israeli elections.44 The growing cultural interconnectedness between both 
states is significant; Russian Jews in Israel seem adamant to retain their Russian identity as 
Russian language daily newspapers and Russian TV beamed via satellite are immensely 
popular among these communities.45 While retaining their own distinct culture, Russian 
Jews are still making strides integrating themselves into Israeli society by embracing civic 
obligations. It is interesting to note that the proportion of Russian Jews serving in combat 
units in the Israeli Army is greater than their proportion of the general population, and their 
patriotism and commitment to the state have not gone unnoticed by older Israelis.46 This 
greater proportion is due in part to a dearth of Orthodox Jews eligible for military service 
exemptions in the Russian-born segment of the Israeli population, but it is noteworthy 
nonetheless. In essence, the world’s largest Russian diaspora, still connected to their 
homeland, will play an increasing role in Israeli politics and this could eventually have 
some bearing on Russian attitudes and policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
 Cultural and linguistic ties are only one dimension of improved Russian-Israeli 
relations. In tune with the theme of advancing economic interests that has become central 
to Russian foreign policy, Russia is also forming a substantial trade relationship with 
Israel, which has grown to be worth more than $1 billion annually.47 In addition, this trade 
relationship has given way to joint defense-industry projects. Russia and Israel have 
already completed development of the Kamov 50-2 attack helicopter, combining a Russian 
airframe with Israeli avionics.48 Russia has also made its spacelift capability available to 
Israel, recently launching the Eros-B imagery satellite for Tel Aviv.49 Joint defense 
industry ventures like these will not only open new markets to Russian arms and expertise, 
they also give Russia greater access to sophisticated technology.50
 Finally, Russia and Israel have come to identify with each other as they both 
continue to face Islamic extremism and terrorist attacks on civilians. Russian and Israeli 
officials have declared their solidarity in the fight against terror numerous times and have 
been conspicuously guarded in their commentary of each others counterterrorism policies. 
Besides sympathizing with each other, there is potential for actual cooperation on issues of 
counterterrorism. Following the Beslan school attack, Israeli officials offered to help 
Russia in its struggle during a visit by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov.51 Israel has 
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 dealt with terrorism far longer than Russia and is viewed by many as a counterterrorism 
laboratory from which the rest of the world can learn. If cooperation on counterterrorism 
training and intelligence sharing occurs, the bonds that have formed between Russia and 
Israel will only become stronger. 
 There are, however, many contentious issues in Russian-Israeli relations that have 
yet to be resolved; Iranian nuclear development, arms sales to Iran and Syria, and an 
invitation to Moscow for Hamas officials following their 2006 election victory are just a 
few areas in which Russia and Israel have serious disagreements. Nevertheless, the 
relationship between Moscow and Tel Aviv has grown closer in recent years, and Riyadh 
is not happy. Russia’s pro-Palestinian tendencies could fade if a strong relationship with 
Israel should emerge, dashing the Saudis’ hopes that Russia would continue to look out for 
Palestinian interests by pushing for a return to the peace process.   
 
Iran 
 
 Russian relations with Iran are also problematic to Saudi Arabia. While Saudi-
Iranian relations have improved significantly in recent years, there was a time when Iran 
was quite hostile toward the Saudis, criticizing their relationship with the US, their backing 
of Saddam Hussein in the Iran-Iraq war, and the treatment of their Shi’a minority. This 
former animosity could be reignited, with growing concern that Saudi Arabia and Iran 
could find themselves backing opposing sides of an Iraqi civil war, following an eventual 
US withdrawal. Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs are also unsettling to the 
Saudis. Tehran’s push to develop fissile material, in conjunction with a long range missile 
capability, could eventually give Iran the capability to launch a nuclear strike on its 
neighbors and lead to the adoption of a more coercive foreign policy.52 Therefore, it should 
come as no surprise that Riyadh does not look favorably on Moscow’s support to Iran’s 
nuclear and missile development programs and conventional forces.  
 Iran has been a lucrative market for Russia to unload military equipment and 
technical know-how in return for hard currency. Russia has sold three Kilo-class 
submarines to Iran and in 2000, President Vladimir Putin decided to walk away from the 
Gore-Chernomyrdin agreement so Russia could enter into a licensing agreement that 
would allow Iran to assemble MiG-29 fighter aircraft and T-72C tanks.53 Iran has also 
benefited from the availability of exportable Russian air defense systems, most recently 
purchasing Tor M-1 tactical surface-to-air missile systems in late 2006. It is also widely 
believed that Iran has benefited from Russian expertise in the development and 
enhancement of its Shehab-3 medium range missile, which could one day serve as a 
nuclear delivery platform. 
 The most important and most profitable Russian contribution to Iranian military 
capability is nuclear cooperation. In 1995, Russia signed on to complete the Bushehr 
nuclear reactor left unfinished by the German firm Siemens shortly after the Islamic 
Revolution. The chance to complete the abandoned reactor was a prime opportunity to 
advance Russian economic interests in the Middle East. It was believed by Russian 
officials that work on Bushehr would bring positive publicity to the Russian nuclear 
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 industry and lead to other deals in the region.54 The Bushehr deal itself was estimated to 
have been worth between $800 million and $1 billion, with eighty percent of the contract 
reportedly being paid in cash, undoubtedly giving a much needed shot in the arm to the 
Russian nuclear industry.55 Russia also stands to gain from enriching uranium for Iran, 
should Tehran choose to forego its fledgling indigenous enrichment capability. 
Despite the destabilizing effects Iranian nuclear and missile advancements could 
have on the region and the objections of the US, EU and others, Russian technical support 
to Iran has been very profitable and is illustrative of Russia’s policy of pursuing economic 
interests first and foremost. While cooperation with Iran is not necessarily grounds for 
severing relations with Russia and foregoing some of the emerging benefits, Saudi Arabia 
will certainly remain wary. 
 
Chechnya, Terrorism, and Islam 
 
The last major foreign policy issue facing Russia relative to Saudi Arabia is the 
secessionist movement in Chechnya, the terrorism campaign conducted in its name, and 
the potential spread of radical Islam among Russia’s Muslim population and the 
neighboring states of Central Asia. While economic considerations involving energy 
pipelines do factor into the Chechnya problem, this is largely an issue of national security. 
Russian officials, including Vladimir Putin, believed that failure to suppress the Chechen 
insurgency could ultimately lead to the disintegration of the Russian Federation. Therefore 
ensuring Chechnya stays pacified remains high on the government’s agenda.56 Moscow 
and Riyadh have long been at odds concerning the spread of conservative Islam. Hard 
feelings surrounding this issue date back to the war in Afghanistan and were reignited 
when Saudi Arabia recognized and provided economic assistance to the Taliban. This 
renewed Islamist influence in Central Asia led Moscow to grant support in the form of 
ammunition, uniforms, fuel, helicopters, intelligence, and air support to Ahmed Shah 
Massoud’s Northern Alliance long before 9/11.57
 Although the Taliban has since been removed from power and Afghanistan is 
slowly being secured and rebuilt under international stewardship, the issue of Islamic 
extremism is still very much on the minds of Russian policymakers. Radical Islam appears 
to be overshadowing separatism as the cause fueling violence in Chechnya and it threatens 
to divide Chechen society itself and usher in more instability.58 Russia charges that Saudi 
Arabia is to blame for this rise in extremism, by not only using its wealth to spread 
Wahhabi teachings, but to fund actual terrorist operations in Chechnya and neighboring 
republics. In Dagestan, for example, officials claimed that at one point, up to three 
thousand Saudi-funded, Wahhabi fighters were operating there.59 It is also worth noting 
that several former key operatives in Chechnya, including the notorious Khattab and 
Sheikh Abu Omar al-Saif, hailed from the desert kingdom. It has also been widely 
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 circulated that the Chechen rebels who seized a Russian theater in 2002 had placed several 
telephone calls to Saudi sponsors during the standoff.  
 In addition to alleged operational aid, both sides remain at odds over the nature of 
Saudi humanitarian assistance to Chechnya. Russia asserts that this aid is being used to 
build schools and mosques that espouse a radical interpretation of Islam. The Saudis 
acknowledge they do not have absolute control over where the donations of their 
independently wealthy citizens ultimately end up, but they insist that Islamic foundations 
based and registered in the kingdom do not engage in funding the spread of radical 
ideology or terrorist activities and that their aims are charitable. Russia is also suspicious 
of Saudi Arabia’s resistance to allow Russian NGOs and government agencies to distribute 
the aid collected by Saudi charities. Saudi Arabia contends that much of the aid does not 
meet the intended recipients when distributed by Russian authorities. As a result, Chechen 
authorities in charge of reconstruction have sought direct links with Riyadh.60
Because Saudi Arabia has some influence and standing among Russia’s estimated 
20 million Muslims, due to both its largesse and status as the guardian of Islam’s holiest 
sites, Russia has sought to use its relations with the kingdom as a means to improve its 
own standing. In addition to its observer status in the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference, closer cooperation with Saudi Arabia on dispensing humanitarian aid could 
significantly boost the Russian government’s image among its Muslim population and give 
it better leverage in dealing with extremism in Chechnya. Riyadh’s official position on this 
subject remains to be seen, however. The royal family’s legitimacy and survival is largely 
dependent on its image as a defender of Islamic causes. Cooperation on aid distribution 
could create the perception of Saudi support for Russia’s operations in Chechnya, which 
would be met with disapproval in much of the Muslim world. 61 Nevertheless, Russia will 
continue to seek cooperation from the Saudis on this subject as it is viewed as being 
critical to the security and stability of Russia itself. 
 
Conclusion  
 
 Russian foreign policy has changed considerably in the several decades that have 
passed since the late Brezhnev era. Gone is the overarching goal of securing influence and 
military ties in order to eclipse US influence in strategic areas such as the Persian Gulf. As 
a result of this change, relations with countries that were once threatened by Soviet-era 
policies are now approached by Russia with tangible interests in mind. Relations with 
Saudi Arabia, both good and bad, are quite illustrative of this. Oil pricing policy is a 
potential area of competition; however the incentive for coordination in order to achieve 
mutual benefits is high. Russia will likely continue to make the advancement of economic 
interests the centerpiece of its foreign policy and opportunities like the development of 
Saudi gas resources will undoubtedly be pursued. In addition, Russia is also compelled to 
pursue economic interests that the Saudis do not approve of if the rewards are great 
enough. Iran represents a lucrative market for readily exportable conventional arms and 
technical knowledge and Israel also offers promising rewards, including access to 
advanced technology, trade and counterterrorism cooperation. Finally, as Russia continues 
to combat Islamist terrorism within its borders, it will likely seek to enlist the Saudis’ help, 
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 fully aware of Riyadh’s stature in the Muslim world and its usefulness in solving the 
Chechnya problem. Simply put, Moscow is no longer primarily interested in winning allies 
and holding sway; it is interested in winning contracts, growing its economy and staying 
secure. 
 
